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DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT BY THE NLRB:
A LACK OF OBJECTIVITY
PERCEIVED
BARRY H. RAINS*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
One of the principal objectives of the National Labor Relations
Act is the protection of the employee's free choice of a collective bar-
gaining representative.' A majority vote of the employees within a
certified bargaining unit establishes the union's representation status,
and the National Labor Relations Board possesses the supervisory and
regulatory powers necessary to insure a properly conducted election. 2
Perhaps the most important step in the election procedure is
the Board's certification of an employee unit suitable for efficient
collective bargaining. The question of union representation may well
be resolved when the Board determines the confines of the appropriate
unit, since the preference of the employee members of the unit prob-
ably will have been ascertained prior to the union's petition. It is the
contention of this article that, in making this important determination,
the Board has frequently allowed one factor to become controlling:
that factor is the extent to which the members of the unit requested,
and other potential units, have been organized. This contravenes the
express mandate of section 9(c) (5) of the act' In addition, this em-
* Columbia University, 1929-1931; LLB, Brooklyn Law School, 1932; M.P.A.,
New York University, 1947; ELM., New York University, 1954; Member, New York
Bar; Member, National Academy of Arbitration; Co-Chairman, Equal Employment
Opportunity Committee, American Bar Association; Adjunct Professor in Industrial Re-
lations Law, C. W. Post College.
1 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
2 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a)-(e) (1964).
3 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) ( 5 ) (1964) states that "in determining
whether a unit is appropriate for the purpose specified in subsection (b) of this section
the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling."
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phasis on the employee's right to organize indicates that the Board
has neglected the corollary to this right, i.e., the right to reject collec-
tive bargaining?
In recent years, there has been substantial controversy over the
weight that should be given to the extent of the union's organizational
success as a factor in the Board's determination of the scope of the
bargaining unit. 5 The Board's increasing reliance on this factor mani-
fests a policy that whatever is good for the growth of organized labor
is good for the country. This attitude is inconsistent with an impartial,
flexible application of the act. When such a premise is given prece-
dence over recognized objectives of the act with which it may conflict,
it signifies a dangerous course of administrative procedure. It is sub-
mitted that this apparent determination of policy may lead to a justi-
fiable loss of confidence in the objectivity and neutrality of the Board's
quasi-judicial processes. This danger is augmented by the rationale
expressed within the Board's published case decisions, which is so weak
and vague° as to demonstrate an a priori approach to the issues in
dispute. An examination of the cases that have dealt with contested
bargaining unit questions supports the conclusion that the Board has
a pronounced tendency to establish as appropriate whatever unit most
reflects the extent of the union's organizational success, regardless of
other considerations.
The Board's determination of the election unit is a matter of
primary concern to the union, since an unsatisfactory choice may re-
sult in an election which rejects any union representation. Due to the
importance of this issue, the so-called "fact-finding, non-adversary"
representation proceedings commonly generate more acrimony and
heated argument than do unfair labor practice controversies. The
Board's apparent lack of both objectivity and consistency naturally
does not alleviate this situation. It would benefit all practitioners in
the field, and eliminate wasted time, effort, and expense, if the Board
would openly declare the criteria which will determine the appropriate
unit. Such a stand would terminate the Board's current piecemeal ap-
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) specifies that an employee "shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . ."
6 See generally Daykin, Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the
NLRB: Principles, Rules, and Policies, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 218 (1958); Grooms, The
NLRB and Determination of the Appropriate Unit: Need for a Workable Standard, 6
William & Mary L. Rev. 13 (1965); Note, The Board and. Section 9(c) (5): Multilocation
and Single-Location Bargaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 IIAny.
L. Rev. 811 (1966).
That the statute itself is ambiguous on the subject of organizational success, see
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 208, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1961).
6 Just recently, the Supreme Court remanded one Board decision which could not
be properly reviewed "due to the Board's lack of articulated reasons." NLRB v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 -43 (1965).
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proach and allow representation hearings to be conducted with far
more efficiency and speed.
It is the purpose of this article to support the contention that the
criteria alluded to in Board decisions are superfluous and inconclusive
factors, to be rationalized away in arriving at final unit determina-
tions; that analysis of Board case law reveals a distinct preference
for bargaining units that coincide with the extent of the union's or-
ganizational success.
II. AN APPROPRIATE VS. THE APPROPRIATE
For many years, the NLRB has adhered to the doctrine that
some organization among employees in a plant unit is preferable to
none at all. This preference stems from the belief that the objectives
of the NLRA will best be achieved by encouraging, not impeding, col-
lective bargaining. It is because of this policy that the Board has
chosen to construe the act to permit the approval of any appropriate
unit, rather than to limit certification to the most appropriate unit.
As the Board said in Black & Decker Mfg. Co.: 7
[I]t has been our declared policy to consider only whether
the requested unit is an appropriate one even though it may
not be the optimum or most appropriate unit for collective
bargaining. We are convinced that such a policy is compat-
ible with the objectives of the Act which seeks to encourage
rather than impede the collective-bargaining process'
To implement this policy, the Board has rationalized a correlation be-
tween the "appropriate" unit and the one which has been most effec-
tively organized. Perhaps as a result of constant repetition by the
Board, this fundamentally unsound approach to the act is rarely, if
ever, questioned today, despite the fact that the text of the act' does
not suggest, nor (in this writer's opinion) even permit such a con-
struction.
The Board's interpretation of the act made one of its earliest
appearances in Garden State Hosiery Co.,'° which was decided prior
7 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964).
8 Id. at 828. See P. Ballantine & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1106 (1963), where the
Board stated that it "must be wary lest its unit determinations unnecessarily impede the
exercise by employees of these rights [to self-organization and collective bargaining]."
9 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (1964) provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof .. .
10 74 N.L.R.B. 318 (1947). The groundwork for this interpretation, however, was
laid as early as 1937. In Gulf Oil Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 133, 137 (1937), the Board approved
a unit which did "not constitute the most effective bargaining unit," because otherwise,
"there will be no collective bargaining agent whatsoever for these workers . ."
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to the adoption of section 9(c)(5). 11 Actually, the three-member
Board disagreed as to the proper weight that should be accorded the
extent of union organization. The majority insisted that the objectives
of the act required the Board to give this factor substantial considera-
tion." The dissent, on the other hand, contended that such an attitude
would "sacrifice . . . the principle of majority rule" and impair "in-
dustrial stability.""
The majority's argument was strained, but, because of its use
as authority in many subsequent Board decisions, it deserves close
attention. The principle issue in the case was
whether the Board should deny the knitting department em-
ployees the benefits of the Act until the other employees
also become interested in collective bargaining, or whether
it should make collective bargaining an immediate possibility
for those who may presently desire it."
The issue was framed in terms compatible with the NLRA as it read
before the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947. The whole tenor of the
act at that time was weighted in favor of encouraging the associa-
tional activities of employees." The Board, in designating bargaining
units, was to "insure to employees the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining . . . ."" Therefore, the
issue in Garden State Hosiery was correctly stated in terms of the
knitters' right to collective representation, a right which was to be
actively promoted by the Board. Although it was argued that the re-
maining employees—a majority in the plant—could be adversely af-
fected by the bargaining tactics of the minority," the Board answered
that the organizational rights of the few must be advanced and should
not be retarded by the reluctance of the many." Thus, any appro-
priate unit must be certified.
This argument, even if legally sound before 1947, became quite
obsolete after that year. The Taft-Hartley amendments de-empha-
sized unionization and statutorily recognized the rights of those em-
11 The case was decided June 20, 1947, and the act did not go into effect until sixty
days after its enactment on June 23, 1947.
12 74 N.L.R.B. at 320 -21.
13 Id. at 327.
14 Id. at 320.
15 Section 7 of the act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), originally read:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.
See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
16 NLRA § 9(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
17 74 N.L.R.B. at 326-28 (Member Reynolds, dissenting). See pp. 188-89 infra.
18 Id. at 324.
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ployees who wished to remain unrepresented. The Board was charged
with the duty of assuring to all employees "the fullest freedom in exer-
cising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter . . . ." 19 And these
rights had been amended to include "the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities ...."" As the House Conference Committee had
stated, the Board was to accord "a substantially larger measure of
protection of those rights when bargaining units are being estab-
lished . . . ."21 It does not seem that carving out an appropriate bar-
gaining unit from the optimum larger unit would be compatible with
this mandate, since those employees who were in the optimum unit
but had rejected organization might find their relationship with the
employer affected by the actions of a minority."
Attempting to rationalize its selection of a bargaining unit which
was not optimum, the Board in Garden State Hosiery resorted to seman-
tic dependence on Webster's International Dictionary. This authority
was employed to demonstrate that the word "appropriate" carried with
it no connotations of the superlative." This may be true, but the act
specifies designation of the appropriate unit.' This does suggest the
superlative. The Board, however, transformed the words "the appro-
priate" to "an appropriate," and this modification was unexplained and
undiscussed. This reasoning, or lack thereof, became authority for
many post-Taft-Hartley decisions to the same effect.'
One of the cases cited by the Board in Garden State Hosiery was
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB.' But this case is hardly sup-
port for the Board's argument. Throughout its opinion, the Supreme
Court spoke of "the appropriate unit" and "the most suitable unit."
For example, the Court states:
The Labor Act places upon the Board the responsibil-
ity of determining the appropriate group of employees for
the bargaining unit. In accordance with this delegation of
authority, the Board may decide that all employees of a
single employer form the most suitable unit for the selection
of collective bargaining representatives, or the Board may
19 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
20 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
21 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1135,
1153 (1947).
22 For example, a strike by an organized minority could easily bring the work of
an entire plant to a halt. In addition, wage increases and changes in terms of employment
secured by the minority will likely have ramifications felt by the majority. See pp. 188-89
infra.
23 74 N.L.R.B. at 324 n.15. 	 •
24 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(6) (1964).
25 E.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 & n.13 (1950), enforced
in part, 190 F.2d 576 (7th ar. 1951).
26 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
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decide that the workers in any craft or plant or subdivision
thereof are more appropriate." (Emphasis added.)
The relevant proceedings in Pittsburgh may be stated simply.
The Board approved the union's petition for a unit composed of the
production and maintenance employees in a multi-plant division of
the, employer's business. After an election won by the union, the em-
ployer refused to bargain, claiming that the union was not the proper
bargaining agent because only a single-plant unit was appropriate.
The Court discussed the employer's contentions, but nevertheless sus-
tained the Board's ruling:
[A]n independent unit at Crystal City, the Board was justi-
fied in finding, would frustrate division-wide effort at labor
adjustments. It would enable the employer to use the plant
there for continuous operation in case of stoppage of labor
at the other plants. We are of the view that there was ade-
quate evidence to support the conclusion that the bargaining
unit should be division-wide." (Emphasis added.)
The Court's position is clearly revealed. There is "the appropriate
unit" in each case, and the Board's decision is sustained only because
there is substantial evidence supporting its finding that the unit
"should"—not "could"—be division-wide.
Today the Board, faced with a bargaining unit controversy,
might concede that the unit requested by the employer is appro-
priate." It will even concede, on occasion, that it may be the most
appropriate." It will conclude, however, that since the unit requested
by the petitioning union is also appropriate, the petition may be
granted." Inevitably, it will cite as precedent decisions leading back
to the Garden State Hosiery case.
Perhaps the most obvious incongruities caused by this interpreta-
tion of "appropriateness" have occurred in the Board's "residual unit"
determinations. Typically in these situations, a group of employees
will have been excluded from other units previously deemed appro-
priate by the Board. A union then petitions the Board to certify a
separate unit consisting of these "fringe" employees, and, even though
the group may be heterogeneous and does not share a community of
interest, the Board will approve the petition. The reason given is that
otherwise these employees will be unable to bargain collectively. 32
27 Id. at 152.
28 Id. at 164-65.
29 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 45, 47 (1965).
32 See, e.g., Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631 (1962).
31 E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra note 29; Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra note 30.
32 E.g., Kraft Foods Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 582, 585 (1956); Kroger Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
274, 275 (1951).
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This doctrine is acceptable where the initial units were the appro-
priate ones, for there is no viable alternative. The Board, however,
does not stop there. Because of its "an appropriate" policy, it will
grant the original petitions even though the requested units are not
optimum and even though the employer objects strenuously." Then,
despite the fact that the remaining employees do not constitute an
appropriate unit under the normal criteria, the Board will neverthe-
less apply its residual unit doctrine to approve the subsequent peti-
tion.
Hot Shoppes, Inc." presents just such a case. The employer's
relevant operations involved the preparation of food at two Chicago
commissaries, the transportation of food to the airport, the loading of
food on planes, and the return of soiled equipment to the commis-
saries. The Regional Director, pursuant to a union petition, found
appropriate, but not optimum, a unit comprising
all flight equipment handlers and their helpers, setup men,
and all regularly employed part-time employees in these
categories engaged in the transportation of food from com-
pany premises to airplanes, installing and removing food
from such airplanes, and transporting food from the air-
planes to the company premises ... but excluding field super-
visors . . . and all other employees 3a
The employer had objected to this unit, claiming that the only appro-
priate unit consisted of all the employees engaged in food, beverage,
and equipment preparation and transportation."
Local 593, AFL-CIO, then petitioned for an election among all
employees other than those previously included in the earlier unit.
The Board approved the petition, finding that "the unit sought herein
is appropriate as a residual unit apart from whether it might be appro-
priate on other grounds?"97 (Emphasis added.) Surely this opinion
illustrates the foolishness and artificiality of the Board's position. It
reaffirms a unit determination which at best is only appropriate—
and certainly not optimum—only to recognize a residual second unit
which is not even appropriate. There can be no justification for such
an absurd result.
III THE SINGLE-PLANT UNIT
The Board frequently invokes a presumption in favor of the
appropriateness of a unit composed of a class of employees in a single
33 E.g., Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra note 30.
34 143 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963), .
35 Id. at 582.
33 Id. at 582-83.
37 Id. at 583.
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plant within a multi-plant operation.' The validity of this presump-
tion is said to be drawn from the statute itself:
A plant unit, being one of the unit types listed in the
statute as appropriate for bargaining purposes, is presump-
tively appropriate, and should, other things being equal,
prevail over other unit types not designated in the statute."
The flaw in this interpretation of the statute is that it has not been
applied to other types of units also specifically mentioned in the same
provision 9 0 There is nothing in the act to suggest a congressional in-
tent to favor single-plant units over these other types. Moreover, ac-
cording to the Board's own reasoning as quoted above, the plant unit
should not necessarily "prevail over other unit types . . . designated
in the statute." Yet the presumption has been applied in favor of the
plant unit even where arguments have been made for an employer-
wide unit—the first unit type listed in section 9(b) of the act.' Be-
cause of the questionable validity of the Board's interpretation, it is
important to analyze the effect of this presumption and to see whether
a pattern of selective application has been emerging.
In 1944, the Board had declared a policy of rejecting units of
debit insurance agents which were less than state-wide or company-
wide in scope. The reasons for this policy were stated by the Board
in the Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. decision: 42
[T]he rapid growth of union organization among insurance
agents makes it clearly appear that provisional units less
than State-wide in scope are, under ordinary circumstances,
unnecessary to make collective bargaining reasonably pos-
sible for them if they desire it .... In the instant case, since
the Federation, the Independent, and the C.I.O. are all ac-
tively engaged in a broad organizational program in Ohio,
and since it may reasonably be anticipated that one of these
organizations may in the near future extend its membership
to State-wide proportions, we are of the opinion that it will
38 E.g., Black & Decker Mfg. Co., supra note 7, at 828; Welsh Co 146 N.L.R.B. 713,
715 (1964); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra note 30, at 631.
39 Beaumont Forging Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2200, 2201-02 (1954).
40 Those other types are the employer unit, craft unit, or subdivision of any of the
designated units. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
41 See e.g., Black & Decker Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Welsh Co., supra note 38; Gor-
don Mills, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 771 (1963); P. Ballantine & Sons, supra note 8. Compare
Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964) (representation), 151 N.L.R.B.
454 (1965) (unfair labor practice), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
42 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944).
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not effectuate the policies of the Act to set up city-wide units
for employees of the Company in Ohio at this time."
Although the express reasons for this policy are in contravention of
section 9(c)(5), the policy was not abandoned, or even modified,
after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
In 1961, the Board finally reversed itself, declaring in Quaker
City Life Ins. Co. that henceforth it would apply "normal unit prin-
ciples to the cases as they arise."" Consequently, the district-office
unit desired by the petitioning union was deemed appropriate. The
reasons given for rejecting the seventeen-year-old doctrine are reveal-
ing. After quoting the above language from its 1944 decision, the
Board stated:
As a practical matter, however, such statewide or company-
wide organization has not materialized, and the result of
the rule has been to arrest the organizational development
of insurance agents to an extent certainly never contem-
plated by the Act, or for that matter, by the Board that de-
cided the Metropolitan Life case."
The Quaker City case did not condemn past Board policy as a
violation of section 9(c) (5), although the Board recognized that the
1944 decision was based on organizational factors." As a matter of
fact, the Quaker City decision seemed to result from consideration of
those same factors, the only difference being that the organizational
efforts of the union had proven unsuccessful.' No other changes from
the conditions which existed in 1944 were mentioned. In addition, if
the Board was indeed attempting to overrule an impermissible criter-
ion and declare the appropriateness of the single-office unit, how can
it so casually disregard seventeen years of precedent?"
That the insurance agents problem is not unique for the Board
is revealed by examination of analogous developments in the area of
retail grocery chains. In its Safeway Stores, Inc. decision" of 1951,
the Board had declared that an appropriate bargaining unit in the
48 Id. at 1640.
44 134 N.L.R.B. 960, 962 (1961) (representation), 138 N.L.R.B. 61 (1962) (unfair
labor practice); enforced in part, 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963).
45 Ibid.
45 Discussing the opinion in the Metropolitan Life case, the Board declared that the
language "clearly ... indicates that the rule was adopted solely in anticipation of broader
organization on a companywide or statewide basis, which at that time appeared im-
minent." Ibid.
47 Compare the two P. Ballantine & Sons cases, 120 N.L.R.B. 86 (1958) and 141
N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963), discussed pp. 190-91 infra.
48 See cases cited in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 820, 827 n.17
(3d Cir. 1964).
49 96 N.L.R.B. 998 (1951).
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retail store trade "should embrace all employees within the cate-
gories sought who perform their work within the Employer's admin-
istrative division or area."" Thus, where a union petitioned for a unit
of employees at a single store and the employer established a larger
'scope of administrative control and community of interest, the Board
would normally dismiss the union's petition." For some reason, the
presumption in favor of the appropriateness of the single-plant unit,
declared at least as early as 1954, 52
 did not influence the rationale of
retail store collective bargaining until 1962.
In Say-On Drugs, Inc.," a decision similar to the Quaker State
case of the previous year," the Board decided to abandon the Safeway
approach in favor of the "same unit policy which we apply to multi-
plant enterprises in general."" After analyzing "all the circumstances
of the case," the Board in Say-On Drugs overruled the Regional Di-
rector and ordered an election in a single-store unit. The principal
reasons for discarding the Safeway policy were: (1) that it impeded
the right of the employees to self-organization; and (2) that it had
ignored the extent of relevant union organization as a factor." Mem-
ber Rodgers, dissenting, felt that the second factor was the controlling
one:
I certainly have no desire to frustrate the employees'
right to self-organization. But that right must be accom-
modated by the Board to the prohibition in Section 9(c)(5)
of the Act that, in deciding the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining, "the extent to which the em-
ployees have organized shall not be controlling." In short,
what the present change signifies, in my opinion, is that the
union's extent of organization has now become, and will be,
a decisive factor in determining the appropriate unit for re-
tail store operations."
It is interesting to note that in 1949 the Board had declared that the
designation of a single-store unit as appropriate, in a case where
50 Id. at 1000. This policy was actually anticipated prior to its specific declaration.
See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 680 (1949); Grand Union Co., 81 N.L.R.B.
1016 (1949).
51 E.g., Weis Mkts,, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 148 (1959); Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co.,
123 N.L,R.B. 316 (1959). The same result was reached when the union sought a unit
composed of only some of the stores in a larger employer division. E.g., Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 797 (1961); Robert Hall Cothes, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1096
(1957).
52 See note 39 supra.
53 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
54 See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
55 138 N.L.R.B. at 1033.
50 Ibid.
57 Id. at 1037.
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management control over a group of stores was centralized, would
violate section 9(c) (5)."
The present policy in this area is still undergoing clarification.
In Weis Mkts., Inc.," for example, the Board denied that the Say-On
Drugs case had abandoned the preference for an administrative or
geographical grouping; it had merely added the possibility that a
single-location unit could be appropriate." Thirteen months later,
however, in Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc.," the Board further re-
fined its retail store policy:
[T]he Board [in Say-On Drugs] abandoned the approach
that a multistore unit alone could be appropriate and adopted
the view that the general unit criteria should apply to
retail store units. Under such criteria a single-plant unit is
presumptively appropriate unless it be established that the
single plant has been effectively merged into a more compre-
hensive unit so as to have lost its individual identity."
(Emphasis added.)
This reaffirmance of the single-plant presumption culminated a sub-
stantial modification of the four-year-old Say-On Drugs policy, which
had merely allowed a single-location unit to be considered appropri-
ate." The dissent in Frisch saw no reason to change the former doc-
trine and felt that the Board's decision violated section 9 (c) (5)."
In order to test the validity of the Frisch decision, the employer
refused to recognize or to bargain with the union. The Board found
this to be a violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the act" and
petitioned the Seventh Circuit for enforcement of its order. The appel-
58 Grand Union Co., supra note 50, at 1017.
59 142 N.L.R.B. 708 (1963).
60 Id. at 710.
61 Supra note 41.
62 Id. at 551 n.l.
63 Say-On Drugs, Inc., supra note 53, at 1033-34 n.4.
64 Members Leedom and Jenkins, dissenting, stated:
Although the majority agrees that the "optimum" unit for collective bar-
gaining would, in this case, be citywide in scope, it finds the single-restaurant
unit appropriate essentially on the ground that the Petitioner seeks to represent
only the employees in the smaller unit. But since, as we have shown, no other
factors support the appropriateness of the single restaurant, this determination
rests solely on the Petitioner's extent of organization, a result which is specifically
forbidden by Section 9(c) (5) of the Act.
147 N.L.R.B. at 556. Compare the dissent of Member Rodgers in Say-On Drugs, Inc.,
supra note 53, at 1037, where a fear was voiced that just such a result as later occurred in
Frisch had become inevitable.
65 151 N.L.R.B. 454 (1965).
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late court found that the Board had determined an inappropriate bar-
gaining unit and therefore denied enforcement's
The Seventh Circuit's opinion is significant because it casts doubt
on the validity of the Board's presumption in favor of single-store
units. The court examined all the circumstances of the case and im-
plied dissatisfaction with a presumption which was so contrary to
the objective factors.° 7 The Board's persistence on the presumption,
even in the face of convincing factual evidence, calls attention to the
very real possibility of a lack of objectivity and thorough reasoning.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF NON-UNION EMPLOYEES
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that, notwithstanding sec-
tion 9(c) (5), the extent of union organization can properly be con-
sidered by the Board when making unit determinations.' Still un-
resolved, however, is the significance which the Board can attribute
to this factor. Since the Board can easily rationalize a biased result
through manipulation of the inferences to be drawn from other rele-
vant factors, it is not yet clear whether this standard will ever be
clearly defined.° In determining the relative weight to be accorded
organizational factors, it is critical to analyze and balance pre-Taft-
Hartley Board decisions, the amendments themselves, and the sub-
sequent case law.
Prior to the passage of section 9(c)(5), the Board had con-
sistently declared that it would not rely solely on organizational fac-
tors when making its unit determinations." As the Board stated in
Hudson Hosiery Co.:"
Extent of organization can be most important, but it can
never be controlling in the full sense of that term. It must
also appear that the unit sought is composed of a well-delin-
eated and functionally coherent group of employees, and that
it has some objective support over and above the petitioning
union's momentary preference. Where the unit sought has
60 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966)._
67 Cf. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964), in which the Board
approved a bargaining unit of one plant of a two-plant subdivision, even though the
"operations of the two plants are integrated with respect to executive, managerial, and
engineering activities." Id. at 827.
68 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1965). •
69 The Board's opinion on remand of the Metropolitan Life case may signify a
partial withdrawal. There the Board asserted that 9(c)(5) "prohibits the establish-
ment of a bargaining unit which would not be appropriate under traditional criteria apart
from extent of organization." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 61
L.R.R.M. 1249, 1253 (1966).
70 See, e.g., Saks & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 413, 415 (1946); Greyhound Terminal, Inc.,
66 N.L.R.B. 1285, 1286 (1946); Paulus Bros. Packing Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1173 (1945).
71 74 N.L.R.B. 250 (1947).
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not met such prerequisites, petitions have been dismissed,
despite the limited extent of organization."
If prior Board policy gave only limited weight to organizational
factors, what then was the gravamen to be eliminated by section
9(c) (5)? The answer may be provided by the report of the House
Conference Committee," in which it is stated:
[T]he conference agreement guarantees in express terms
the right of employees to refrain from collective bargaining
or concerted activities if they choose to do so. This addi-
tional guarantee—recognizing and protecting as it does the
rights and interests of individuals and minorities—will, it
is believed, through wise administration result in a substan-
tially larger measure of protection of those rights when bar-
gaining units are being established than has heretofore been
the practice." (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the Board was to place even less reliance on union
organizational success than it had before and was to give additional
consideration to the rights of all other employees. Implementation of
this purpose was effected by Congress in at least three amendments
to the act: (1) section 7 was amended to provide the right to refrain
from exercising the privilege of self-organization;" (2) section 9(b)
was amended to require the Board to select bargaining units which
would guarantee the exercise of all rights under the act, not just self-
organization;" and, (3) section 9(c) (5) was added as a clear expres-
sion of the de-emphasis desired."
In it decisions subsequent to the enactment of the amendments,
the Board indicated a misunderstanding or lack of acceptance of this
change in emphasis. Taft-Hartley language was often used to support
adherence to pre-Taft-Hartley policies." As a result, phrases which
were never intended to be synonymous were treated exactly as if they
were, and became precedent for future rulings." Despite the clear
72 Id. at 252.
73 H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1135
(1947).
74 Id. at 1153.
76 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Compare 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
76 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964). Compare 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
77 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5)'(1964).
78 Compare, e.g., Garden State Hosiery Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 315, 324 (1947), with
Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950). Both decisions reject, for the
same reason, the necessity of approving only the optimum bargaining unit, and both
claim to he thus adhering to § 9(b) of the act. Between the rendering of these two de-
cisions, however, that section was amended. Yet the Board apparently made no dis-
tinction between the different provisions.
70 In recent years, for example, the Board has explicitly equated the "rights guaran-
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mandate of section 9(c)(5), the Board has exhibited an increasing
propensity to seek results which would accommodate the union's or-
ganizational success. This tendency has produced consistent disagree-
ment among the Board members themselves, with several dissents
accusing the majority of blatantly violating the act.'
Board dependence upon the union's organizational success has
had a significant detrimental effect upon the exercise of majority rule
among employees. Where the majority of employees in the most
appropriate unit opposed the petitioning union, 8 ' the carving out of
an appropriate unit may place a segment of the majority in a minority
status within the unit. Under the rubric of "majority rule," this
minority must then accept a union they do not want—a union which
could not otherwise win. The segment of the majority which remains
outside the unit also suffers, for subtle but intense pressures now
emerge to infringe upon the freedom of choice. For example, the em-
ployer will frequently try to promote the entrenched union, either
because he prefers to deal with one union rather than many, or be-
cause he has received an implied promise of future sympathetic
treatment. He may shift work from one unit or plant to another in
order to increase his negotiating strength. In addition, it is often the
remaining, non-union employees who absorb the cost of union gains.
Employers inevitably budget future wage increases, and where the
union-controlled unit wins more than its allotted share, the non-union
employees' share frequently will be reduced proportionately. Mem-
bers Leedom and Jenkins, dissenting from a decision which was sub-
sequently denied enforcement," warned the Board that approving a
single-restaurant unit within a chain would dilute the rights of the
non-unionized majority:
[T]he contract terms with the union selected by the em-
ployees in the single-restaurant unit will undoubtedly have
a potent impact on the terms and conditions of employment
teed by this Act" with the "rights to self-organization and to collective bargaining." E.g.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 45, 47 (1965); Bamberger's Paramus, 151 N.L.R.B.
748, 751 (1965); Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 598, 600 (1964); Bagdad
Copper Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1496, 1498 (1963); P. Ballantine & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 1103,
1106 (1963).
80 See, e.g., Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 556 (1964) (Members
Leedom and Jenkins, dissenting); F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307, 310 (1963)
(Members Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 138, 144
(1961) (Member Rodgers, dissenting).
81 The majority may not oppose unionism in general or all unions. It is more
likely that they will oppose that particular union which seeks to represent them. This
opposition may be due simply to the union's distasteful methods or totalitarian regime.
82 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964) (representation), 151
N.L.R.B. 454 (1965) (unfair labor practice), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th
Cir. 1966).
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of all other employees in the chain. Further, . . . if the em-
ployees in the single-restaurant unit have a dispute with the
Employer and go on strike, they may lawfully picket any
of the restaurants in the chain, even though the union does
not represent employees in such other units. In other words,
under the majority decision, although the employees in the
single-restaurant unit alone are entitled to vote as to whether
the Petitioner should represent them, this vote will be an
effective determinant in the labor relations pattern for other
employees in the chain who have had no voice in deciding
whether or not they wished to be represented by the Peti-
tioner."
These results, it is submitted, do not conform to the present
neutral balance established by the act. Section 9(c) (5) was intended
to equalize two protagonists—the union and the employer; but, more
importantly, it was designed to protect the forgotten man—the in-
dividual employee himself. Protection of his rights often may not
coincide with the institutional interests of a particular labor union.
By carving the optimum unit into smaller ones, the Board of ten
acts against the interests of a majority of employees. These employees
may find that their "free choice" is effectively narrowed to either
rejecting the possibility of any union or accepting a particular one,
because the union, once entrenched, will seek to absorb the remaining
employees." In fact, this is precisely what the Board apologists an-
ticipate. They argue that an election unit need not be a negotiating
unit; rather election units should be "starting points" and "building
83 147 N.L.R.B. at 557. See D'Armigene Co., 29 R.C. 6 (1965) (unreported), in
which the Board designated two "cutters" and a "sorter" as an appropriate bargaining
unit, thereby enabling three of the company's eighty employees to subsequently bring
to a halt, by a strike, the entire production chain of a fully integrated plant. Compare
Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1956), enforced, 241 F.2d
913 (4th Cir. 1957); Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 422, enforcement
denied, 235 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1956).
84 Not only will the resistance of the remaining employees weaken, but the union
will solidify and increase its support within the unit. In Century Elec. Co., 146 N.L.R.B.
232 (1964), the Board held that a self-determination election was not required for a
residual group of employees:
[Wile find that the employees heretofore excluded from the production and
maintenance unit at Century Foundry were excluded by virtue of historical
accident rather than upon the basis of any real difference in function or interest
from those of the production and maintenance employees. In accordance with
the Board's established policy, such employees are appropriately a part of the
production and maintenance unit and on proper request will be included in such
unit without being granted a self-determination election.
Id. at 243-44. It appears, then, that a union, with an eye to electoral success, can carve
out any appropriate unit, leaving only a fringe group outside. Later, when the support of
the union employees has intensified, the union can petition for a larger unit and sweep
in the remaining employees.
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blocks!"86 Such an attitude renders hollow the protection guaranteed
in section 9(b) of the act." This hollowness is clearly revealed by a
comparison of the two P. Ballantine & Sons cases."
In 1958, Local 153 of the Office Employees International Union
(AFL-CIO) petitioned for an election in a unit consisting of all "out-
side salesmen" working out of the branch sales offices of P. Ballan-
tine & Sons in Newark, New Jersey and New York City. The em-
ployer moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
only appropriate unit would be one that included the outside salesmen
of all of its ten branches. The Board noted the following facts: sales
quotas for the branches were set by the home office, although in-
dividual quotas for the salesmen were fixed locally; personnel and
payroll records were kept both in Newark (the central office) and in
the branch offices; salary checks for virtually all salesmen were pre-
pared at the main office; the final responsibility for hiring and firing
was actively exercised by a central sales manager; policies as to labor
relations, methods of compensation, vacations, holidays, and fringe
benefits were formulated by the home office, which also handled griev-
ances and arbitration proceedings in all of the branches; and finally,
there was some history of transfers between the branches and the
regions. In summary, the Board stated that "the Employer's sales
operations are centrally directed from Newark by a general sales
manager."" Consequently, the requested unit was "too narrow" in
scope to constitute an appropriate bargaining unit, and the Board
dismissed the union's petition.
Five years later, the same union, seeking to represent the same
salesmen of the same employer, petitioned the Board for a unit even
more narrow in scope than that sought in 1958." Although the Board
was made aware of and in fact mentioned the earlier case, it could
point to no change in circumstances since that decision. As a matter
of fact, the Board again noted that "there is a substantial degree of
centralization and integration in the Employer's sales organization."'"
85 Note, The Board and Section 9(c) (5): Multilocation and Single-Location Bar-
gaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 835 (1966).
86 The employees may not be the only sufferers. The employer may be forced to
negotiate with several unions, each pushing in a different direction. These separate unions
will often fail to appreciate the total picture and to understand the employer's problems.
Jurisdictional disputes often follow. Negotiations being numerous, are more time-consum-
ing and tedious. The number of strikes increases, and, with them, the public incon-
venience.
87 120 N.L.R.B. 86 (1958); 141 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963).
88 120 N.L.R.B. at 87.
89 The unit requested by the union consisted of all branch salesmen at the em-
ployer's Newark branch. This same unit was an alternative request in the 1958 case
and was dismissed as well.
99 141 N.L.R.B. at 1104. The Board attempted to establish the existence of some
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Nevertheless, the Board explicitly reversed its precedent and granted
the union's petition. The reasons given are revealing:
Although the Board necessarily has wide discretion in the
exercise of [its] authority, the statute does provide certain
explicit guidelines. First and foremost is the requirement
that each appropriate unit determination should "assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this Act," i.e., the rights to self-organization and
to collective bargaining. In order to effectuate this funda-
mental policy declaration of the Congress, the Board must
be wary lest its unit determinations unneccessarily impede
the exercise by employees of these rights. Such would be
the result in the instant case if the Board were to continue
... as it did in [the 1958 case]. .. ."91 (Emphasis added.)
What about the right of the employees "to refrain from any or all of
such activities" guaranteed by section 7 of the act since 1947? This
provision seems to have been neglected by the Board.
There can be no easy rationalization of this decision. Because
of its conclusions in the earlier case, the Board was not free to manip-
ulate inferences from the objective criteria as it had done in other
decisions, but was forced to reveal its true guidelines. It clearly ap-
pears that the Board's action in specifically overruling the first Bal-
lantine case was based solely on the fact that the union had been
unable to organize the larger unit." This approach is prohibited by
section 9(c) (5) of the act.
V. MANIPULATION OF OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
Four fundamental criteria are cited by the Board almost every
time they are asked to approve a bargaining unit composed of em-
autonomy in the branch offices by noting that day-to-day decisions were generally left
"in the hands of the individual branch managers." Id. at 1105. Such supervision seems
a weak foundation upon which to build an argument for autonomy, however, since all
businesses, no matter how centralized, leave daily policy decisions to section heads.
91 Id. at 1106.
92 The Board seemed disturbed by the fact that no union had been able to organize
the company:
The failure of any labor organization to file a petition for, no less win an election
in, a branchwide unit of salesmen employed by P. Ballantine & Sons since that
1958 decision, vividly attests to its adverse impact on organizational development.
It was not contemplated by the Act that Board unit determinations would frus-
trate the organization of employees, and this result could not have been either
intended or anticipated by the Board in deciding the aforementioned case.
Ibid. This statement provoked the following question from Member Rodgers, dissenting:
Do my colleagues also deprecate the Board's traditional production and main-
tenance unit rule as unduly impeding the organization of the myriad number of
unorganized plants in this country as to which petitions have never been filed?
Id. at 1110 n.27.
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ployees from more than one plant within a multi-plant operation.
They are: (1) history of bargaining; (2) employee interchange or
transfer; (3) degree of autonomy at each location; and, (4) distance
between locations. These criteria are rarely given equal weight in any
one decision, and any one criterion is rarely given the same relative
weight in different cases. Instead, the Board considers each set of
circumstances in its entirety, and renders a decision appropriate for
the particular case only. Thus, it is exceedingly difficult to establish
a misuse of these criteria." Adding to this difficulty is the Board's
annoying habit of using its "short-form" opinion and decision in the
treatment of such objective criteria. For example, the Board will often
evaluate the degree of employee interchange without citing figures;"
it will frequently appraise the distance between two locations as "sig-
nificant" without analyzing its effect on a suburban, mobile work
force;" and it will consistently conclude that supervision at one loca-
tion is "autonomous" without explaining its test." An excellent ex-
ample of the way the Board can manipulate the "objective criteria"
is seen in the Liebmann Breweries, Inc. cases."
In the most recent Liebmann case (1963), the petitioning union
sought a unit of the employer's salesmen located at one New Jersey
sales office. The employer contended that only an overall unit of the
sales personnel at its seven locations would be appropriate. The Board
ruled in favor of the union, and an analysis of its four principal
reasons points to their speciousness.
1. Single-Office Units Are Presumptively Appropriate. As the
discussion above indicates," the Board's reasons for this presumption
completely break down where, as here, the employer has argued for
an employer-wide unit, since both are specified in the act."
2. Geographic Separation of the Sales Offices. In its statement
of the facts, the Board cited "a substantial geographic separation be-
tween the branches and sales offices, ranging from 27 to more than
93 "There are so many good reasons one may easily find for the propriety of any
particular unit's serving as the bargaining agency that anyone attacking the appro-
priateness of a certified bargaining unit wages an uphill fight." NLRB v. Schill Steel
Prods., Inc., 340 F.2d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court has similarly recog-
nized the difficulty of evaluating the Board's dependence on particular factors. NLRB
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1965).
94 E.g., Web Mkts., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 708, 710 (1963); P. Ballantine & Sons, 141
N.L.R.B. 1103, 1105 (1963).
95 E.g., Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 825, 828 (1964) (24 miles); Dixie
Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 632 (1962) (20 miles); Michele Frocks, 121 N.L.R.B.
1273, 1277 (1958) (12 miles).
96 E.g., McCoy Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 383, 384 (1965); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra
note 95, at 632-33.
07 92 N.L.R.B. 1740 (1951); 101 N.L.R.B. 616 (1952) ; 142 N.L.R.B. 121 (1963).
98 See p. 182 supra.
99 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
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140 miles."'" Yet this same distance failed to affect the Board's
rationale in an earlier case between the same parties which reached
an opposite result.'" Furthermore, the Board has often stated that it
does not consider geographical separation of controlling weight.'
In fact, it is impossible to anticipate just how the Board will, at any
given time, interpret the distance factor. A distance of twenty miles
between plants has contributed to a finding of single-plant units,'"
while the same distance has also been ignored and a two-plant unit
preferred.'" A single-location unit has been approved even where
the stores were situated "within a few blocks of one another,'"
although multi-plant units have been required where the plants were
thirty miles apart 106 and eighteen miles apart."
It was previously noted that for many years the Board found a
strong community of interest among insurance agents' and among
retail market employees,' even though they were separated by hun-
dreds of miles. Noted also was the ease with which the Board reversed
itself, without reanalyzing its specific conclusions as to the significance
of these distances.'" When the Board speaks about "substantial" dis-
tance, what, then, is its index of values? "Substantial" in regard to
what? While conceivably there may be material differences from in-
dustry to industry, the Board never bothers to articulate any. Sim-
ilarly, while the Board's prior lack of concern about particular dis-
tances may be sufficient grounds for overruling precedent, the Board
never troubles to explain why.
Given the abundance of relevant considerations, the Board is not
to be criticized for reaching general conclusions on the totality of
facts; but the public in general, and the reviewing courts in particular,
must be told the reason for a specific factor's relevance and why it
was assigned "substantial" significance in one case and almost none
in the next. The Board's refusal to do this in Liebmann (1963) leaves
100 142 N.L.R.B. at 124.
101 101 N.L.R.B. 616 (1952).
102 See, e.g., Veeco Instruments, Inc., 29 R.C. 474 (1966) (unreported); Herpol-
sheimer Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1452, 1453 (1952); Grand Union Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1017
(1949).
103 Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra note 95,
104 Russel Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 668 (1953).
105 Frisch's Big Boy Bl-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 554 (1964) (Members Leedom
and Jenkins, dissenting).
nil Boland Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1949).
107 Textron, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 19 (1957).
105 See discussion of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944), and
subsequent cases, pp. 182-83 supra.
los See discussion of Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 998 (1951), and subsequent
cases, pp. 183-86 supra.
110 See Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961); Say-On Drugs, Inc.,
138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
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unsupported its mystical conclusion that, although unimportant in
1951 and 1952, the same distance is "substantial" in 1963.
3. Autonomous Supervision in Daily Operations. In Liebmann
(1963), the Board explicitly found that there was a single employer
involved, and that
all matters related to labor relations and employee terms and
conditions of employment are determined by the appropriate
management officials in the Brooklyn headquarters office,
and are uniform throughout the sales department. In addi-
tion, all hiring, firing, and other personnel matters must be
approved by the Brooklyn headquarters 111
The Board mysteriously concluded, however, that "the branches and
sales offices are, within the limits of certain instructions and policies
laid down by the management of the Company, essentially autono-
mous operations."12 (Emphasis added.) The authority of the branch
managers was delineated to show the autonomy of supervision. They
had been given authority to discipline employees for "minor infrac-
tions" only; to supervise and attempt to improve employee perfor-
mance; to make recommendations concerning merit increases when
the employee's records are reviewed by the central office; to make
recommendations with respect to hiring and firing and other personnel
action. These recommendations were followed "in the main" and
apparently rejected the rest of the time. The managers also held
weekly sales meetings and "watched sales and merchandising results."
If this company's operations are not totally integrated, whose
are? How is it possible to place less responsibility in the hands of
office managers? Surely it would be difficult to devise a multi-branch
sales organization with more centralized control. Is the Board saying
that every multi-branch sales operation has "autonomous supervision"
per se? If so, this criterion is a constant and should never be cited
by the Board.
The Board's argument becomes even more disturbing when it
is compared to the 1951 Liebmann opinion. In that case, the Board
had characterized virtually the same operational situation in terms
diametrically opposed to the instant conclusion. The Board had pre-
viously stated that because of the
marked centralization of the Employer's sales organization,
the virtual absence of local autonomy in hiring and dis-
charge, the central control exercised with respect to super-
vision, wages, working conditions, and general policies, and
111 142 N.L.R.B. at 123.
112 Ibid.
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on the basis of the entire record in the case, we find that
both the primary and alternative units sought by the Peti-
tioner are too narrow in scope and therefore inappropriate
for collective bargaining purposes." (Emphasis added.)
This earlier case involved precisely the same parties and pre-
cisely the same facts. There is no assertion that any condition has
changed, and the Board even explicitly accepted its previous fact-
finding.' The only reason even hinted at for this startling turnabout
is that the earlier Liebmann cases had been "reversed on other
grounds." 115 The reason for this reversal, as stated in P. Ballantine
& Sons,"° had been the implication in the Liebmann cases that single-
plant units were inappropriate. Examination of the earlier Liebmann
cases, however, fails to reveal any consideration other than the factual
circumstances. Indeed, the Board in the 1963 case also attempted to
rationalize that decision solely on the basis of the facts. Not one of
the three cases discussed a presumption for or against single-location
units.'"
4. Lack of Employee Interchange Between Locations. In the
1963 Liebmann case, the Board stated: "While there have been
occasional temporary transfers of salesmen between the branches or
sales offices, permanent transfers have been rare—six in the past five
years."' The implication is that this lack of permanent interchange
supports a single-location unit finding. The Board, however, failed
to explain why temporary transfers are less significant than perma-
nent ones. Indeed, the reverse would seem to be true: recurring, tem-
porary transfers, by preventing the establishment of a definite com-
munity of interest among employees at one location, would impede
successful collective bargaining far more than permanent ones. In
addition, frequent temporary transfers evidence functional integra-
tion among different locations.
The Board's preference is even more surprising when compared
to its pronouncement a year later in Black & Decker Mfg. Co.' The
Board there stated:
With respect to the transfer and interchange of em-
ployees between the plants, the most relevant evidence in
113 92 N.L.R.B. at 1742.
114 142 N.L.R.B. at 123. Member Rodgers, crsgenting, stated: "No legally significant
distinction can be made between the earlier cases and the instant case." Id. at 125 n.11.
115 Id. at 122 n.4, 123 n.6.
116 141 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1108 n.22 (1963).
117 The 1963 case does include this presumption among the reasons for the deci-
sion, 142 N.L.R.B. at 125, but it is never mentioned in the opinion, and would therefore
appear to be subordinate to the factual determinations and objective criteria.
118 Id. at 124.
119 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964).
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the record indicates that there were approximately 136 inter-
plant transfers in the period from September 1962 to Sep-
tember 1963. Of that total, however, 83 were transfers of
30 days or less."'
The Board continued in a footnote:
As transfers of more than 30 days in length approach
a semipermanent change of status, we find the shorter trans-
fer periods more significant in determining the integrated
nature of the two plants."'
Why does the Board neglect to explain its departure from the con-
trary implication in the Liebmann (1963) case? Furthermore, how
does it arrive at an automatic rule for the relevancy of a one-month
cut-off? Why is it that transfers for thirty days are significant, but
transfers for thirty-one are not?"' There is no need here for an ar-
bitrary line. The Board prior to Black & Decker made assessment on
the totality of circumstances; it still does.'
The foregoing analysis of the Liebmann problem reveals the type
of inconsistent application of objective criteria which frustrated the
First Circuit and the Supreme Court in the Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
case.'" Such criteria are undeniably essential in the determination of
appropriate bargaining units; however, until the Board clearly artic-
ulates the relative significance of each of the tests, biased or pre-
determined decisions may be camouflaged by superfluous discussion.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATIONS
It is to be remembered that most of the decisions which are cited
as precedent from case to case are decisions that cannot reach the
courts on a direct appeal, since representation cases are administrative
rulings that are not subject to judicial review. 125 The indirect route
that is available for procuring review by the courts is not, as a prac-
120 Id. at 827.
121 Id. at 827 n.3.
122 It is also interesting to note that the Board has frequently discussed employee
interchange in terms of an annual percentage. Yet, inconsistencies in the application and
significance of these figures detract from their evidentiary value. See Note, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 811, 829-31 (1966).
123 See, e.g., Guyan Mach. Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 60 L.R.RM. 1373, 1378 (1965)
(unfair labor practice).
124 142 N.L.R.B. 491 (1963), enforcement denied, 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964),
remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965), aff'd on rehearing, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 61 L.R.R.M.
1249, 1253 (1966). Compare NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895
(7th Cir. 1966).
125 American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 US. 401 (1940). See noire v. Greyhound
Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1965);
61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
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tical matter, readily accessible to the employer who is unhappy with
the Board's determination of a bargaining unit. This route requires that
the employer refuse to recognize the union which has won an elec-
tion in the approved unit, and thereby subject himself to a section
8(a)(5) 128 charge by the union; the result, as an unfair labor prac-
tice controversy, could then be appealed to the courts. Such a route
would finally allow the employer his day in court on the bargaining
unit dispute at the time the Board seeks enforcement of its order in
the section 8(a) (5) violation.
Obviously, this indirect method of review, aside from the ex-
tended time involved, 127 imposes dangers of interim strikes and addi-
tional unfair labor practice charges, coupled with the possibility of
orders requiring reinstatement of employees and back pay awards.
These dangers may pose too great a gamble for even the soundest of
companies in the face of the odds against winning a reversal of the
Board's determination of the appropriate bargaining unit. The Board's
decision, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed. 128
Judicial reluctance to upset Board decisions can be seen in a
comparison of NLRB v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. 129 and
NLRB v. Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery Co.' Both cases, de-
cided by the same court, involved substantially identical fact situa-
tions:
In both the employees were engaged in the manufacture of
ladies' full fashioned hosiery involving a variety of opera-
tions, superintended by one man, which included knitting
performed by approximately one-third of the total em-
ployees. In both the Board originally determined that an
appropriate bargaining unit should consist of all the produc-
tion and maintenance employees on a plant-wide basis, and
in both, several years after, it was ascertained that the union
did not represent a majority of these employees; and years
later those who worked in the knitting group were organized
and the Board certified them alone as an appropriate bar-
gaining unit.'
126 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
127 The Supreme Court has recognized the "significant delays" caused by lack of
direct review of representation hearings, but felt that "Congress explicitly intended to
impose precisely such delays." Boire v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 125, at 477-78.
128 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 . U.S. 485, 491 (1947); NLRB v.
Hurley Co., 310 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1962); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d
208, 210 (5th Cir. 1961).
129 235 F.2d 413 (4th Cir.), denying enforcement to 115 N.L.R.B. 422 (1956).
130 241 F2d 913 (4th Cir. 1957), enforcing 115 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1956).
131 Id. at 915.
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Despite the "marked similarity in the two cases," 182 the court
reached opposite results. In Glen Raven, the court felt that "there
can be no reasonable doubt that the Board's action was controlled
by the extent to which the employees of the company had been organ-
ized."'" In Morganton, however, the court was unable to assume this
position. The two cases should be distinguished, the court said, be-
cause involved in Glen Raven was a single union which had altered
its immediate goals; the union in Morganton was not the same union
that had previously attempted to organize the entire plant. In addi-
tion, the Morganton union's attorney had stated to the Board exam-
iner that the union would not be interested in an over-all unit in the
future.
If the distinction is not compelling, it must be remembered that
the courts, no matter how convinced of the Board's parochialism in
a particular case, cannot overturn such a decision unless it is arbitrary
or carpricious 134 or not "supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole . . . ."" 5 Even such restrained judicial
review presumably "does not extend to those issues on which the
Board's specialized experience equips it with major premises inaccess-
ible to judges . ."" 6 The court must not substitute its own wisdom
or discretion for that of the Board.
The rare situation in which a reviewing court can hear a direct
appeal from a bargaining unit determination is exemplified by the
case of Leedom v. Kyne. 137 In that case, the Board approved a bar-
gaining unit consisting of professional and non-professional employees
and refused to direct a vote which would have ascertained whether
the former would accept such a unit.'" Section 9(b) (1) of the act
gives to professional employees the right to accept or reject, by ma-
jority vote, inclusion in a unit with non-professionals.'" The presi-
dent of the association of professionals brought suit in the federal
district court to strike down the Board's order as beyond its powers
132 Ibid.
133 235 F.2d at 416.
134 Mountain States Tel. Sr Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 478, 479-80 (10th Or.
1962); NLRB v. Hurley Co., supra note 128, at 161.
132 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, supra
note 128, at 491.
136 NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir. 1951) (per L.
Hand, J.). Judge Hand continued: "Just where the Board's specialized experience ends
it may no doubt be hard to say ...." Ibid. But see Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB,
329 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1964), where the Board was reversed for failure to admit critical
evidence in an unfair labor practice proceeding. The evidence might have revealed a
Board violation of § 9(c)(5).
137 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
138 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1956).
139 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1964).
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and contrary to the act. The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the association,'" and the court of appeals af-
firmed."'
The Supreme Court affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. 142
Although the court had declared several years earlier in American
Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB 143 that bargaining unit determinations were
not subject to direct judicial review, Kyne was held to be distinguish-
able because it was not a suit "to 'review,' in the sense of that term
as used in the Act . . . "144 The Court felt that Congress could not
have intended that those injured by agency action in excess of dele-
gated powers would be deprived of direct judicial protection.
Justices Brennan and Frankfurter, dissenting, feared that the
majority decision would induce clever lawyers to find "some alleged
`unlawful action,' whether in statutory interpretation or otherwise,
sufficient to get a foot in a District Court door ...." 1" The threatened
flood of direct appeals, however, has apparently never materialized.'"
This is due to the strict construction given Kyne by the courts,'
especially the Supreme Court, which at least twice has emphasized
the "painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries" of the case.'"
VII. CONCLUSIONS
As a general rule, reviewing courts ought not to psychoanalyze
lower adjudicatory bodies. To do so would greatly weaken the admin-
istrative process by undermining the authority of, and confidence in,
agency determinations. In addition, accurate inferences as to subjec-
tive motivation are almost impossible. On the other hand, if the NLRB
is to preserve its adjudicatory independence and finality, it must ex-
hibit the objective, neutral reasoning which Congress assumed it
would have.
Some judicial review of administrative decisions is, of course,
necessary, since agency determinations could involve misinterpreta-
tions of relevant law, or inconsistent applications of similar facts."
The courts cannot provide a meaningful review of Board decisions,
140 148 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1956).
141 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
142 Supra note 137.
143 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
144 358 U.S. at 188.
143 Id. at 195-96.
146 But see Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966). Compare
Dutchess County Aviation, Inc. v. Administrator, 251 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
347 See, e.g., Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., 355 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1966); Lawrence
Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
148 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association For Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 660 (1965); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 125, at 481.
149 See, e.g., NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
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however, if the Board refuses to explain its rulings. Discussion of
various objective factors is insufficient when these factors acquire
different significance in different cases. It is meaningless for the
courts to continually offer possible reasons for Board holdings be-
cause they must defer to an assumption of agency "expertise." If the
Board's decisions are to withstand the challenge of judicial review, it
should be due to the Board's open, logical, and rational reliance on the
stated criteria. If the courts bend even more to rationalize and apolo-
gize for unsupported Board decisions, then the system of judicial
review will have failed to provide the salutary objective consideration
essential to an effective and fair quasi-judicial administration of the
law.
Analysis of the Board's appropriate bargaining unit determina-
tions over the last twenty years reveals an apparent disregard for the
neutral balance provided by the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
act sought to de-emphasize self-organization and to reestablish the
rights and free choice of the individual employee. The Board's lack
of attention to this congressional purpose has been difficult to estab-
lish through normal judicial review because of the vagueness of Board
opinions. And perhaps the resultant lack of admonition has encour-
aged the Board in the rightfulness of its policies. Judicial insistence
on coherent administrative opinions, possibly stimulated by the Su-
preme Court's recent recognition of the problem,' can force the
Board to be clear and specific. Until this situation of clarity and spe-
cificity is reached, the Board's apparent lack of objectivity, and its
apparent dependence on the union's extent of organizational success,
will be difficult to detect and control. The Taft-Hartley Act does not
deserve such unsatisfactory administration.
150 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
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